Book Review and Author Response: Work, Love, And learning in utopia

Book Review Submitted by 
Matthew Lee, Harvard University
The caring relation is perhaps the core “existential activity through which we most fully realize our humanity” (Kleinman, 2020:4) and connect with a life-giving “presence” involving the “fullness of being” (Kleinman, 2020:3). It might be seen as the “the ultimate reality of life” (Noddings, 1992:15). Caring can be defined as attending to the well-being of another (Erickson and Stacey, 2013:178). Acts of care offer us the possibility of transcending the self-preservation mode of existence—which is grounded in a fundamental experience of scarcity—by engaging us with a healthy and meaningful process of self-expansion rooted in a perception of abundance (Baugher, 2019:42; Ritchie-Dunham, 2014). In other words, by genuinely caring for others we relate to them not as objects but as sacred subjects, and in the process experience the sacredness of ourselves and our world (Buber, 1923/1970). 
Yet care often seems in short supply, as intimacy is intentionally and effectively “organized out” of social contexts (Latimer and Gomez, 2019:250). Many individual interactions and broad social policies are fundamentally uncaring. Caring often involves “hard, sometimes tedious, unglamourous work” (Kleinman, 2020:4; Erickson and Stacey, 2013). It is therefore little surprise that carework is not evenly distributed. That, for example, “boys are raised to be careless, girls to be careful” (Kleinman, 2020:3). Carework inequality has significant implications for altruism, a sense of purpose in life, and many other aspects of flourishing (Xi et al., 2018). Work, Love, and Learning in Utopiacontinues a long tradition that exalts caring as a preeminent value. In this book, psychological anthropologist Martin Schoenhals boldly declares that “human happiness derives from, and even is tantamount to, mutual nurture” (p. 17). But his book makes a more provocative—and admittedly Utopian—claim that an equality of love (p. 241) can be achieved through a restructuring of society in ways that minimize hierarchies of all kinds: “Utopia must equalize wealth, but it also must equalize love and attention” (p. 3). To put it bluntly, “Hierarchy precludes happiness” (p. 18).
Utopian thinking in social science is relatively rare these days, and Schoenhals book offers a refreshingly creative and playful spirit, grounded in serious scholarship such as the anthropologist Victor Turner’s conception of an egalitarian, altruistic communitas. I appreciated the book’s assertion of the primacy of love and care—and even joy!—in human relations of all kinds, including education, politics, and culture. I recalled that natural disasters, in addition to causing dreadful suffering and often death, also sometimes release people from the social disaster of an alienated daily life by creating liminal space of a temporarily egalitarian communitas born of the need for mutual care for survival (Solnit, 2013). Schoenhals explores the possibility of sustaining communitas through social engineering. Like other members of the ASA Section on Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity, I am keenly interested in the topics he covers, such as the types of solidarity that infuse inclusive communities, the location of love and compassion within a group’s hierarchy of values, and a consideration of the cultural and structural factors that shape durable forms of equality and happiness. The book argues that an ideal love is at the heart of Utopia and that this love is fundamentally altruistic: “pleasing the other pleases the self” (p. 26). I appreciated how Schoenhals advanced the thesis that prosociality and pleasure are therefore not contradictory. In addition: “The basic goal of Utopia [is] to maximize happiness” (p. 7).
But what kind of happiness? This is a central question in many academic disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, and it continues to generate much debate (Lee, Kubzansky, and VanderWeele, 2021). This is also the point where audiences are likely to diverge in their appreciation for some of the positions developed in the book. Schoenhals highlights both “positive emotions” and “general well-being” (p. 5). But in a deeply divided world, the generation of positive emotions and subsequent well-being is dependent on frameworks of meaning that vary across interpretive communities. Schoenhals’s Utopia is primarily therapeutic, rather than charismatic (Rieff, 2008). Dichotomies always oversimplify, but they can be instructive. Briefly, charismatic social orders are founded on interdicts: “divinely given cultural norms that impose limits on behavior and demand unqualified obedience” (Lee, Poloma, and Post, 2013:204). The myriad rules of Judaism’s creedal order provide the paradigm case. Socrates, to take an example from a different cultural context, heard an inner voice that stopped him from doing some things that might have brought pleasure but were not for him to do. This voice “always forbids” (Jaspers, 1962:10) and it provided a moral compass when reason failed. For Socrates, “it is better to suffer than to commit injustice” (Jaspers, 1962:10), in spite of the absence of positive emotions. On the other hand, therapeutic orders free individuals from the many constraints of charismatic orders. Freedom to self-actualize is paramount and therapeutic culture is a “releaser from the interdicts” (Rieff, 2008:5). When interdicts say “no,” therapeutic norms often say “yes,” as long as positive emotions are generated. For Schoenhals, “positive emotions are what Utopia should be all about” (p. 5). 
This is where religious readers—who represent a clear majority of the world’s population—and those who are spiritual but not religious, may begin to sense some cultural imperialism in Schoenhals’ Utopian project. For such people, happiness is not primarily defined in terms of penultimate ends such as positive emotions or happiness (Lee, Kubzansky, and VanderWeele, 2021). Rather, “well-being is redefined in terms of doing God’s will and being the face of God for others” (Lee, Poloma, and Post, 2013:97). This does not mean that such people are joyless. Far from it. Rather, they perceive a divine calling to engage with the problems of the world in a manner that integrates joy and suffering (Lee et al., 2013). Such transformative engagements are not limited to the religious, but the meaning of “happiness” is constructed with different cultural materials depending on immersion in a social order that is more or less charismatic or therapeutic. What counts as “prosociality” will differ across these groups. In addition, for many religious people, the “real essence” of marriage is not a “bonding mechanism for making non-kin into kin” (p. 87); it is instead a divine covenant. 
The enforcement of social norms is not frictionless, even in Utopia. Schoenhals states that “the central purpose of Utopia’s judiciary… will be to preserve equality in all forms” (p. 240) and the “equality of love will be regarded as seriously as equality of wealth and power. Courts will play an important role in enforcing this equality” (p. 241). Utopian courts are tasked with enforcing the equality of love “non-coercively” (p. 242). Schoenhals points out that “You can’t legislate love” (p. 241). But if a person feels “socially neglected” by “friends or family members, or coworkers,” and the parties cannot “devise their own mutually agreeable solution,” then the “court may devise its own solution” (p. 243), including the employment of “protectors” armed with “tranquilizer weapons.” The recalcitrant will ultimately be “required to leave Utopia for another society willing to take them or to establish their own society” (p. 241), although they are permitted to “come back to Utopia periodically to visit” (p. 241).
An important goal of some religious traditions is to find a way to promote harmonious relations without resorting to such separations. The vision of a Beloved Community promoted by many in the U.S. Civil Rights Movement is just one manifestation of such a unifying vision. I appreciate Schoenhals’ contributions to a Utopian vision grounded in caring relations and I found much of value in the book. My own Utopian dream involves active love transforming suffering into flourishing in a manner that fosters greater unity. We can find abundant inspiration and practical guidance for this work in contemporary, non-Utopian, restorative/transformative justice and peacemaking communities (Braithwaite, 2005; Gready and Robins, 2014; Helmick & Petersen, 2001; Lederach, 2015). But it is also good to dream of even more Utopian arrangements.



References
Baugher, J. (2019). Contemplative caregiving: Finding healing, compassion & spiritual growth through end-of-life care. Boulder, CO: Shambhala.
Braithwaite, J. (2005). Between Proportionality & Impunity: Confrontation⇒ Truth⇒ Prevention. Criminology, 43(2), 283-306.
Buber, M. (1970). I and Thou. Scribner’s. (Original work published 1923).
Erickson, B. J. & Stacey, C. L. (2013). Attending to Body and Mind: Engaging the Complexity of Emotion Practice Among Caring Professionals.” Pp. 175-196 in A. A. Grandey, J. M. Diefendorff, & D. E. Rupp (Eds.), Emotional Labor in the 21st Century: Diverse Perspective on Emotion Regulation at Work. Routledge. 
Helmick, R. G., & Petersen, R. (Eds.). (2001). Forgiveness & Reconciliation: Public Policy & Conflict Transformation. Templeton Foundation Press. 
Gready, P., & Robins, S. (2014). From transitional to transformative justice: A new agenda for practice. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 8(3), 339-361.
Jaspers, K. (1962). Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus: The Paradigmatic Individuals. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. (Original work published 1957).
Kleinman, A. (2020). The Soul of Care: The Moral Education of a Husband and a Doctor. Penguin.
Latimer, J., & Gomez, D. L. (2019). Intimate entanglements: Affects, more-than-human intimacies and the politics of relations in science and technology. The Sociological Review Monographs, 67, 247–263.
Lederach, J. (2015). Little Book of Conflict Transformation: Clear Articulation of the Guiding Principles by a Pioneer in the Field. Simon and Schuster.
Lee, M. T., Kubzansky, L. D., VanderWeele, T. J. (Eds.). (2021) Measuring Well-Being: Interdisciplinary Perspectives from the Social Sciences and the Humanities. Oxford University.
Lee, M. T., Poloma, M. M., & Post, S. G. (2013). The Heart of Religion: Spiritual Empowerment, Benevolence, and the Experience of God’s Love. Oxford University.
Noddings, N. (2005). The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education. Columbia.
Rieff, P. (2008). Charisma: The Gift of Grace, and How It Has Been Taken Away from Us. Vintage.
Ritchie-Dunham, J. (2014). Ecosynomics: The Science of Abundance. Vibrancy.
Solnit, R. (2010). A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities that Arise in Disaster. Penguin.
​Xi, J., Lee, M. T., Carter, J., & Delgado, D. (2018). Gender differences in purpose in life: The mediation effect of altruism. Journal of Humanistic Psychology. DOI: 10.1177/0022167 818777658









Author Response Submitted by 
Martin Schoenhals, Appalachian State University

​In his review of my book, Work, Love, and Learning in Utopia: Equality Reimagined, Matt Lee writes: “I appreciated how Schoenhals advanced the thesis that prosociality and pleasure are…not contradictory.” The lack of a contradiction between prosociality and pleasure is an important point I make in my book, and one that is especially critical for altruism theorists. In what follows I elaborate on the prosociality/pleasure conflation and then describe its importance for understanding altruism. 
In my book I write: “…the human capacity for pleasure is not a selfish one at all, but is precisely the opposite. Because humans feel empathy for others, a capacity most other animals lack, our pleasure sets up a virtuous cycle in which our pleasure and the pleasure of those we please are mutually reinforcing” (Schoenhals 2019: 4). 
My assertions are supported by the realities of human nature. We may follow our linguistic and cultural models and intuit a pleasure/prosociality opposition, but intuition does not adequately map reality. Consider the evidence from neuroscience. Klimecki (2015) argues that there are two different and antagonistic neural systems, one for pleasant events and social connectedness and another system for unpleasant events and social disconnectedness, so that prosociality, social connectedness, is conjoined with, not opposed to, pleasure. Further, while the unpleasurable system can motivate empathy, it often leads to withdrawal, aggression and burnout among caregivers. The author describes research she and colleagues have carried out to train individuals to strengthen the pleasurable and socially connected response. Pleasure may be an insufficient word to describe what is happening neurologically but so are other words—love, devotion, etc. We really need a word that combines the notion of pleasure with that of prosociality. I will let the reader think of suitable candidates.
For theorists of altruism, it is especially important to recognize that pleasure and prosociality are related, and not opposed. The reason this is important is because this relationship helps resolve the altruism paradox, as it exists among humans. Some biologists apply non-human explanations to humans to overcome the paradox, but this is problematic. A common explanation for how altruism can be adaptive among non-humans, given that it entails sacrifice by an individual, is that the target of benevolence is often a relative, hence altruism is a way to help our own genetic endowment. Altruism is genetically self-interested.

The problem among humans is that even in forager camps there are many individuals present to whom one shares little or no genetic relatedness, so the help within the residence group is often going to non-kin (Hill et al. 2011). This situation becomes even more evident in agricultural societies, since one’s patrilineage mates are the ones whom one defines as “family” and hence are the targets of the greatest altruistic help while very close matrikin, though genetically closely related to ego, are often ignored when it comes to those ego will help. Thus how did human altruism evolve when human culture so often defines “family” in a way orthogonal to, if not opposed to, genetic relatedness?
Some economists and others, drawing on forager studies, have suggested that if X is a good giver, others will often give to X. In this formulation, reciprocity and altruism are mutually beneficial to both members of a giving-receiving dyad. The problem with this formulation is that humans help those outside their own community and hence we are often altruistic toward those we may never meet. This form of disinterested generosity is evident in the poor Dalit (Untouchable) women I met in southern India, who sent some of their meager incomes to help coastal Indians victimized by the tsunami of 2004, people they would never meet and who were highly unlikely to ever reciprocate their kindness. 
So how do we explain such actions? I would suggest that it must be the case that pleasure and prosociality are conjoined. We feel some reward when we help another human, even someone we do not know. Thus human compassion perhaps uniquely solves the altruism paradox because “sacrificing” to help others’ well-being is not a full sacrifice, because helping others is rewarding for them and for us, with the nature of our reward being emotional, something scholars too easily overlook with their/our instrumental and pragmatic way of thinking. And, isn’t pleasure from pleasing another individual a prime human desire, tantamount to love itself, where the beloved’s happiness redounds—at least in principle—to our own happiness? In that case pleasure and human connectedness are reinforcing and pleasure is not the narrowly self-interested notion that the English word would lead us to believe is the case. 
I hope the reader will read my book, Work, Love, and Learning in Utopia: Equality Reimagined. It is a book that attempts to do what many of us who are social scientists so often fail to do—to use our knowledge about societies and biology to prescribe a humanly possible alternative world. When we leave it to economists alone to advocate broad policy, we are implicitly endorsing the view that money is all that matters. I know prescription has many pitfalls but we need to engage in thinking that is both imaginative and fact-based about alternative worlds. Doing so, social scientists can contribute to the discussion about how society could be refashioned, to the significant benefit of all of us. 

References
Hill, Kim R., Robert S. Walker, Miran Božičević, James Eder, Thomas Headland,
Barry Hewlett, A. Magdalena Hurtado, Frank Marlowe, Polly Wiessner, Brian Wood. 2011. Co-Residence Patterns in Hunter-Gatherer Societies Show Unique Human Social Structure. Science, v. 331: 1286-1289.
Klimecki, Olga M. 2015. The plasticity of social emotions. Social Neuroscience v. 10, no. 5: 466-473. 
Schoenhals, Martin. 2019. Work, Love, and Learning in Utopia: Equality Reimagined. New York: Routledge.

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